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ADOPTION - RIGHT OF INHERITANCE IN ABSENCE OF LEGAL
ADOPTION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT TO ADOPT AND
OTHER REMEDIEs-Adoption was unknown at common law. l\.fodern
statutes permitting adoption are largely derived from Roman ideas, which
were introduced into this country first through the civil law of Louisiana
and later by statutes, beginning with Massachusetts in 1851.1
Under the English common law, the only persons capable of inheriting property were blood relations of the deceased. On the other hand,
most modern adoption statut~s permit inheritance by adopted children
equally ·with natural children.2 Adoption being purely statutory, the
early cases denied the right of inheritance by supposedly adopted children when the statute was not strictly followed. 3 Though still purporting to require strict compliance with the adoption statutes, equity has
evolved a remedy during the last sixty years which, in effect, allows a
supposedly adopted child to claim the property of the deceased. This
remedy is a decree of specific performance of a contract to adopt.

A. The Remedy of Specific Performance
To understand the development of the specific performance remedy,
two analogous situations must be examined. Contracts bet\veen adults
to convey realty or transfer personal property have long been enforced
against a deceased promisor's estate. 4 . This is also true of contracts to
devise property,5 even where the subject matter is "all the property
owned by the promisor at the time of his death."r. Such contracts are
not enforceable, however, where the result would be inequitable, 7 or
where there is insufficient evidence of the agreement. 8
.1 Brosnan, "The Law of Adoption," 22 CoL. L. REV. 332 (1922): In re Sessions
Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888). Before passage of general statutes permitting
adoption, special legislation in several states provided for adoption of specifically named
children. See Davis v. Hendricks, 99 Mo. 478, 12 S.W. 887 (1890); Power v. Hafley, 85
Ky. 671, 4 S.W. 683 (1887).
2 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, §§262, 263 (1931).
3 Shearer v. Weaver, 56 Iowa 578, 9 N.W. 907 (1881); Woods v. Evans, 113 Ill. 186
(1885); Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84 (1896).
4 Haines v. Haines, 6 Md. 435, (1854); Twiss v. George, 33 Mich. 253 (1876); West
v. Bundy, 78 Mo. 407 (1883).
5 Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870); Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N.Y. 480 (1870); Sword
v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247 (1875); Spencer v. Spencer, 25 R.I. 239, 55 A. 637 (1903).
o Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N.Y.) 279 (1846); Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483,
41 N.W. 514 (1889); Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218 (1893).
7 Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N.J.Eq. 332 (1855).
8 Mundy v. Foster, 31 Mich. 313 (1875); Spencer v. Spencer, 26 R.I. 237, 58 A. 766
(1904); Roberge v. Bonner, 185 N.Y. 265, 77 N.E. 1023 (1906).
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On the basis of these analogies, equity next enforced contracts to
adopt and devise property to the child, and contracts to adopt and make
the child an heir. The remedy spread rapidly from four early cases9 and
has been universally accepted.10
Probably the leading case illustrating the application of the remedy
is Chehak v. Battles.11 An agreement was si~ed in which the natural
mother (probably unable to support the child) agreed to give up custody
to a couple in return for their promise to adopt the child and give him
all the rights of a natural child, including "all the rights of inheritance
by law." An actual, statutory adoption was never made. Upon the
death of the adopting couple, the court held the quasi-adopted child was
entitled to share equally with the three natural children, taking his share
by virtue of a decree of specific performance of the contract against the
estate.
Although agreeing with this general rule, the courts, consistent with
their treatment of contracts to transfer or devise as between adults, have
denied specific performance where the result would be inequitable12
or where there is insufficient evidence of a contract to devise or make the
child an heir.13 The rule is often stated that the evidence will be scrutinized, and the contract must be established beyond a reasonable dou'Bt.14
I. Comparison of the Theoretical Bases of the Remedy
Cases where there has been no direct evidence of a contract to devise
or make the child an heir have created the most difficulty. The first case
to grant a right of inheritance in the absence of an express property
agreement was Wright v. Wright. 15 The Michigan adoption statute of
1861, under which the child was adopted, had been declared unconstiOVan Dyne v. Vreeland, 11 N.J.Eq. 370 (1857); Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101
(1876); Sharkey v. McDermott, 91 Mo. 647, 4 S.W. 107 (1887); Van Tine v. Van Tine,
(N.J.Eq.) 15 A. 249 (1888).
10 For cases enforcing contracts to adopt and leave property, see Godine v. Kidd, 64
Hun. 585, 19 N.Y.S. 335 (1892); Bums v. Smith, 21 Mont. 251, 53 P. 742 (1898); Anderson v. Anderson, 75 Kan. 117, 88 P. 743 (1907). For cases enforcing contracts 'to adopt and
make the child an heir, see Winne v. Winne, 166 N.Y. 263, 59 N.E. 832 (1901); Tuttle v.
Winchell, 104 Neb. 750, 178 N.W. 755 (1920); Gravning v. Olson, 62 S.D. 139, 252
N.W. 13 (1933); Chambers v. Byers, 214 N.C. 373, 199 S.E. 398 (1938). Contra, Carter
v. Capshaw, 249 Ky. 483, 60 S.W. (2d) 959 (1933).
11133 Iowa 107, llO N.W. 330 (1907).
12 As where tlie adopting parent remarries; Gall v. Gall, 64 Hun. 600, 19 N.Y.S. 332
(1892); Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 (1896).
13 Shakespeare v. Markham, 72 N.Y. 400, (1878); Gall v. Gall, 64 Hun. 600, 19
N.Y.S. 332 (1892); McTague v. Finnegan, 54 N.J.Eq. 454, 35 A. 542 (1896).
14 Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N.Y. 39, 69 N.E. 118 (1903); Holt v. Tuite, 188 N.Y.
17, 80 N.E. 364 (1907); Garnache v. Doering, 354 Mo. 544, 189 S.W. (2d) 999 (1945).
1599 Mich. 170, 58 N.W. 54 (1894).
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tutional.1 6 After the death of the adoptive father, the child claimed
against the heirs-at-law, a sister and a deceased brother's children. The
child had worked without pay on the adoptive father's farm after reaching majority and never knew that he was not a natural child. The three
opinions of members of the court represent substantially the three views
taken by subsequent cases in other courts.
Justice Long found an implied contract that the child was to inherit
the property. His theory was that from the agreement to adopt, plus
other facts and circumstances, an inference_ should be drawn of a contract to make the child an heir.17
Justice Grant's view was that "equity should declare that to be done
which the parties clearly intended." He believed that the early New
Jersey cases18 were not based solely on the existence of a promise to
leave property, and that a contract to adopt could be enforced without
showing a promise to devise or make an heir. Under this theory the
rights of inheritance "naturally £low" from enforcement of the contract
to adopt-the so-called "equitable adoption" theory.19
Justice Hooker dissented on the ground that a child not legally
adopted could claim only by virtue of specific performance of a contract
to leave property to him, and that the testimony conclusively showed
the adoptive father had never made any such promise.20
It is much easier to support the implied promise theory than the
equitable adoption theory. Once the initial hurdle of finding the implied promise is crossed, the granting of specific performance rests upon
16 People v. Congdon, 77 Mich. 351, 43 N.W. 986 (1889).
17 Subsequent cases following the implied promise theory are:

Crawford v. Wilson,
139 Ga. 654, 78 S.E. 30 (1913); Prince v. Prince, 188 Ala. 559, 66 S. 27 (1914); Hickox
v. Johnston, 113 Kan. 99, 213 P. 1060 (1923); Soelzer v. Soelzer, 382 lli. 393, 47 N.E.
(2d) 458 (1943). See 171 A.L.R. 1315 (1947).
18 Van Dyne v. Vreeland, 11 N.J.Eq. 370 (1857); Van Tine v. Van Tine, (N.J.Eq.)
15 A. 249 (1888). See note 9, supra.
10 Subsequent cases following an equitable adoption theory are: In re Estate of Firle,
197 Minn. I, 265 N.W. 818 (1936); Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 S.(2d) 417
(1943); Roberts v. Sutton, 317 Mich. 458, 27 N.W.(2d) 54 (1947). Prior to 1917 the
adoption statute of Missouri required only a deed in writing. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1909) §167J.
Just as performance removes the similar bar of the statute of frauds for conveyances of land,
the court in Lynn v. Hockaday, 162 Mo. Ill, 61 S.W. 885 (1901), granted specific performance of an oral contract to adopt. The decree declared the child "duly adopted and
an heir at law." (Italics added.) Many later Missouri cases so enforce a mere contract to
adopt. These cases are often cited in other jurisdictions without due notice of their distinctive basis. See 17 Wash. Univ. L. Q. 362 (1932).
20 Subsequent cases denying recovery on the basis of either a promise implied from
an agreement to adopt, or the equitable adoption theory are Monson v. Monson, 174 Cal.
97, 162 P. 90 (1916); Wall v. Estate of McEnnery, 105 Wash. 445, 178 P. 631 (1919);
Morris v. Trotter, 202 Iowa 232, 210 N.W. 131 (1926); St. Vincent's Asylum v. Cent.
Wisc. Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206 N.W. 921 (1926); Hatchell v. Norton, 170 S.C. 272,
170 S.E. 341 (1933); Clarkson v. Bliley, 185 Va. 82, 38 S.E.(2d) 22 (1946).
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the same reasoning as that used where there is an express promise to
leave property. There is some doubt as to whether the court can properly
assume that the adopting parent intended to leave his property to the
child in the absence of any statements or other evidence of his intention. Also, it is more difficult to justify a judicial decree which violates
the literal provisions of the adoption statutes and the statutes of descent
and distribution, ,vhen based merely on a status created by the agreement to adopt, rather than an express or implied agreement to devise
or make the child an heir.
Still, there are hard cases where the contesting heirs are remote relatives of the deceased and it seems a hardship on the supposedly adopted
child not to carry out the decedent's probable intent. Usually such
a child has grown up as a member of deceased's family, and everyone
concerned has thought the child would inherit, before discovery of the
failure of legal adoption. Since recovery· is granted at the discretion of
the equity court, perhaps the remedy should be available in these cases,
even though used sparingly.
Several additional arguments make the equitable adoption theory
more difficult to support. Were the deceased living, the adoptee could
not specifically enforce the contract to adopt because of the personal
nature of the contract. 21 The heirs or administrator cannot be made to
adopt the child and the courts admit that they _are merely giving the
child property rights. 22 Without the aid of the implied promise to devise
·or make an heir, it is almost impossible to find the source of equity's
power to contradict the statutes of adoption and of descent and distribution. Merely to say upon proof of a contract to adopt equity will
regard the child as adopted for purposes of inheritance seems to overrule the early cases which said that specific performance of a mere contract to adopt will not be granted.23

2. Trends in Michigan
In Albring v. Ward, 24 the Michigan court refused to grant specific
performance of a contract to adopt where there was no evidence except
the articles of adoption, which were void under the unconstitutional
statute of 1861. Although purporting to distinguish Wright v. Wright,
Erlanger v. Erlanger, 102 Misc. 236, 168 N.Y.S. 928 (1917).
In Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Co., 39 N.M. 256, 45 P.(2d) 927 (1935), the court
admitted specific performance of a contract to adopt to be impossible after the death of the
promiser, but said the fiction of equitable adoption was impelled by the child's strong equity
and by desire to prevent fraud.
23 See cases cited supra, note 3.
24 137 Mich. 352, 100 N.W. 609 (1904).
21
22
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the case may overrule the implied promise theory of that case. In each
case there was a written contract to adopt, though ineffective as a legal
adoption, from which a promise to leave property could have been
implied. On an equitable adoption theory, however, it is possible to
reconcile the two cases; in Alhring v. Ward the claimant knew she was
not a natural child, and the decedent had a natural son. So in the
latter case equity simply refused the claimant's right to share in the
estate, regarding only "that as done which ought to be done."
The possibility of a different result, depending on which theory is
used, is again illustrated in a recent Michigan case, Perry v. Boyce.25
The deceased, MacGregor, m~t Perry, a fourteen-year-old boy, while
travelling in the South. Apparently with the consent of his father,
Perry returned to Michi2:an with MacGregor, where he helped the older
man earn a livelihood. There was some testimony that MacGregor had
intended to adopt Perry, and he was accepted in the community as
MacGregor's son. MacGregor had signed certain papers leaving property to Perrv, but these did not comply with the necessary formalities
for a will. The court admitted that these papers could not be held to
be a contract to convey property.
The trial court held that Perry could not be treated as if he had been
adopted, but found the existence of a partnership. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the partnership, but found sufficient evidence of
a contract to adopt. From this inference of a_n agreement to adopt, the
court held that Perry was equitably entitled to all the property of the
deceased.
The court relied chiefly upon Roberts v. Sutton,26 a prior Michigan
case. That decision, like many others, contained language to the effect
that the court will grant specific performance of a contract to adoot.
This seems usually to be an abbreviated statement of the principle that
eauity will grant specific performance of a contract to adopt insofar as
inheritance rights of the child are concerned, where the facts support
recovery by the implied promise theory. 2 ' In Perry v. Bovee, however,
there is.no direct evidence of a contract to adopt, and it is doubtful
whether the evidence would support recovery by the child if it were to
be granted onlv on proof of an agreement to leave property. 28 To support recovery by the implied promise theory, an agreement to leave

.

25 323 Mich. 95, 34 N.W.(2d) 570 (1948). See also the two opinions in Walsh v.
Fitzgerald, 67 S.D. 623, 297 N.W. 675 (1941).
20 317 Mich. 458, 27 N.W.(2d) 54 (1947).
27 See cases cited in note 17, supra.
28 Cf. Clemons v. Clemons, 193 Okla. 412, 145 P.(2d) 928 (1943); Stanley v.
Wacaster, 206 Ark. 872, 178 S.W.(2d) 50 (1944); Holland v. Martin, 355 Mo. 767, 198
S.W.(2d) 16 (1946); Johnson v. Olson, (S.D. 1947) 26 N.W.(2d) 132.
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property would have to be implied from a mere implied contract to
adopt. Such a double inference is questionable.
Taken together, the cases seem to show an extension of the specific
performance remedy from the firmer ground of the implied promise
theory to a recovery supported only by the equitable adoption theory
expressed by Justice Grant in Wright v. Wright. If not that, the Michigan court now seems prepared at least to imply a contract to leave property on the somewhat tenuous basis of a double inference from facts
implying an agreement to adopt.

3. Factors Which May Defeat Recovery
Even in a case where the supposedly adopted child has recognized
rights in a decedent's estate, other factors may prevent recovery. If there
is an agreement to leave specific property or the property owned by the
promisor at his death, the promisor cannot defeat the contract by a will
or conveyance.29 If the agreement is only to make the child an heir,
. however, the promisor may divest himself of his property by inter vivos30
or testamentary transfer. 31 Where the court uses the equitable adoption
theory, it would seem that the child should get only the rights of an heir.
When the property left by the deceased is real estate, and the agreement was oral, there is some conflict as to the operation of the statute
of frauds. The majority of cases hold that performance of the contract
to adopt by the natural parent or guardian, and by the child, removes
the bar of the statute. 32 However, some cases require that the transferee must go into possession to defeat the operation of the statute, so
that the child likewise must have gone into possession.33
Since the consideration passing to the promisor is twofold-the surrender of custody by the natural parent or guardian and the performance
29 Bichel v. Oliver, 77 Kan. 696, 95 P. 396 (1908); Peterson v. Bauer, 83 Neb. 405,
ll9 N.W. 764 (1909); Rogers v. Schlotterbach, 167 Cal. 35, 138 P. 728 (1914). Contra,
Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472, 26 N.E. 890 (1891); Mahaney v. Carr, 175 N.Y. 454, 67
N.E. 903 (1903) (dicta).
301\falaney v. Cameron, 98 Kan. 620, 161 P. 1180 (1916); Mahaney v. Carr, 175
N.Y. 454, 67 N.E. 903 (1903).
31 Davis v. Hendricks, 99 Mo. 478, 12 S.W. 887 (1890); Mahaney v. Carr, 175 N.Y.
454, 67 N.E. 903 (1903); Minetree v. Minetree, 181 Ark. 111, 26 S.W.(2d) 101 (1930);
In re Bamber's Estate, 147 Misc. 712, 265 N.Y.S. 798 (1933).
32 Kofka v. Rosicky, 41 Neb. 328, 59 N.W. 788 (1894); Bedel v. Johnson, 37 Idaho
359, 218 P. 641 (1923); Levenson v. Mayerowitz, 181 Misc. 526, 41 N.Y.S.(2d) 835
(1943); Winkelmann v. Winkelmann, 345 Ill. 566, 178 N.E. 118 (1931); 16 MINN. L.
REV. 578 (1932).
33 \:Vallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N.E. 666 (1886); Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530,
29 A. 15 (1893); Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122,229 S.W. 1114 (1921). In 1933 New
York amended its statute of frauds to require expressly a contract bequeathing property to
be in writing. N.Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney 1938) § 31 (7).
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of the duties of a natural child by the adoptee-some courts have held
that misbehavior by the child constitutes a failure of consideration.34
In such cases the promisor is not bound by his contract. Although a few
cases have refused relief on the ground that the necessary consideration
was not present,3 6 the great majority of cases have found consideration
in the love and affection to be received by the adopting parents from the
child, care during old age, and perpetuation of the family name.36
A few early courts were troubled because the child was not a party
to the original contract between the adopting parent and the natural
parent. 37 Since the widespread approval of actions by third party beneficiaries, this objection has not been raised in recent cases.
Some confusion also existed in early cases with regard to illegalitiy
of a contract to adopt. Where the natural parent sought to regain custody
of the child, it was sometimes held that a contract to adopt was illegal,
since it was against public policy for a parent to barter away his child.38
The better considered cases have regarded the welfare of the child as
the determining factor, however. 39 Any illegality would seem to make
the contract only voidable, so that the child could elect to affirm. No
recent case has been troubled by this factor.

B. Other Remedies Available in Absence of Legal Adoption
A number of cases have granted the right of inheritance to a quasiadopted child on the basis of an estoppel.40 The theory is that since the
adopting parents would have been estopped from denying the validity
of the adoption, heirs claiming through them are also estopped. However, it is hard to see how the child could have relied on a contract ·to
34 As where the child leaves home, fails to visit parents, or fails to meet family obligations after maturity. Ball v. Brooks, 173 N.Y.S. 746 (1918); Garnache v. Doering, 354 Mo.
544, 189 S.W.(2d) 999 (1945). Cf. Tuttle v. Winchell, 104 Neb. 750, 178 N.W. 755
(1920). See 11 A.LR. 819 (1921).
35 As where the child is :in orphan and his status in life is improved; Dusenberry v.
Ibach, 99 N.J.Eq. 39, 133 A. 186 (1926); or the adopting parent is the child's stepfather
to whom the child owes services anyway; Taylor v. Boles, 191 Ga. 591, 13 S.E.(2d) 252
(1941).
36 Healey v. Simpson, I 13 Mo. 340, 20 S.W. 881 (1892); Soelzer v. Soelzer, 382 Ill.
393, 47 N.E.(2d) 458 (1943); Hendershot v. Hendershot, 135 N.J.Eq. 232, 37 A.(2d)
770 (1944).
37 Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, ll0 N.W. 330 (1907); Crawford v. Wilson, 139
Ga. 654, 78 S.E. 30 (1913); Bassett v. Arn. Baptist Puhl. Soc., 215 Mich. 126, 183 N.W.
747 (1921). See 2 A.LR. ll97 (1919); 73 A.LR. 1396 (1931).
38 Hernandez v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 S. 641 (1905); Hooks v. Bridgewater, Ill
Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921).
39 Stickles v. Reichardt, 203 Wis. 579, 234 N.W. 728 (1931).
40 Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.(2d) 72 (1934); Shaw v. Scott, 217 Iowa
1259, 252 N.W. 237 (1934); Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.(2d) 906 (1940).
Contra, Carter v. Capshaw, 249 Ky. 483, 60 S.W.(2d) 959 (1933). See 27 A.LR. 1365
(1923).

1949

J

COMMENTS

969

make him an heir, if at any time the deceased could have disinherited
him by will or conveyance.41 It would seem that inheritance by estoppel
is not inconsistent with the specific performance theory, so that both
doctrines can be followed in the same jurisdiction.42 Thus, estoppel may
be a direct basis for recovery or it may be used to support the specific
performance theory. 43
Where the statutory procedure requires the probate court to enter
a decree of adoption upon a showing of certain facts, and the decree
omits a technical requirement, several cases have decided that the child
can secure a nunc pro tune decree to amend the faulty adoption decree. 44
Restitution of the value of the services rendered is usually an alternative remedy for the supposedly adopted child. In fact, two courts
have stated that this is the only remedy available to the child where no
agreement to devise or make an heir accompanies the contract to adopt.45
However, restitution is often a less desirable remedy; not only is the
amount of recovery likely to be less, but also the statute of limitations
may have run as to the major portion of such services.

C. Conclusion
Although there is no common-law adoption analogous to the common-law marriage, a child may claim rights of inheritance upon contract or estoppel principles in the absence of a valid statutory adoption.
When based on an express contract to devise or to make the child an
heir, recovery seems well founded. However, many logical difficulties
are presented in the absence of an agreement with respect to property.
Generally, the majority of cases have allowed recovery, either on an
implied promise or equitable adoption theory. These cases, however,
together with the digests and encyclopediae,46 have largely overlooked
a substantial minority of cases which deny recovery unless the statutory
adoption practice has been followed or a contract with respect to property can be shown.47
James C. Mordy
41 See supra, notes 30 and 31.
42 See 17 TEx. L. REv. 339 (1939).
43 Both theories were used in Barney v.

Hutchinson, 25 N.M. 82, 177 P. 890 (1918);
32 HARV. L. REV. 854 (1919).
44 Ward v. Magness, 75 Ark. 12, 86 S.W. 822 (1905); Re Reichel, 148 Minn. 433,
182 N.W. 517 (1921); Benton v. King, 199 Ky. 307, 250 S.W. 1002 (1923).
4:; Taylor v. Thieman, 132 Wis. 38, 111 N.W. 229 (1907); Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa.
440, 68 A. 1038 (1908); Davies' Estate, 289 Pa. 579, 137 A. 728 (1927). Dicta to the same
effect is found in Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 29 A. 15 (1893); Riley v. Riley, 38 W.Va.
283, 18 S.E. 569 (1893).
4GSee 27 A.L.R. 1327 (1923); 142 A.L.R. 84 (1943); 171 A.L.R. 1315 (1947);
I AM. Jun., Adoption of Children,§§ 16, 20; 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Children,§§ 26-29.
47 See note 20, supra.

